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with massive lending from China. For decades, 
China has been constructing railways in the African 
continent; some examples are Djibouti-Ethiopia, 
Kenya-South Sudan, Nigeria, and so on. Since 2010, 
China has been the number one investor and financier 
in the continent. However, where are Europe and 
Japan? Although they were colonialists and lenders in 
the past, they have now, if not completely withdrawn 
from, have at least significantly decreased direct 
lending on infrastructure investments, especially 
since the 2008 global financial crisis. There was a time 
when Japan was playing the role China plays today, 
and politically at least, Japan still does not want to 
surrender in its geo-economic competition with China 
in the continent. 
Chinese influence in the continent goes beyond the 
economic sphere. Politically too, China is assuming 
a leadership role in the ‘African League of Non-
democracies.’ In some parts of the continent, especially 
in the North and Central, more governments are 
becoming non-democratic in terms of free elections 
and governance structure. According to the well-
known Freedom House Report¸ the overall score of 
democracy in North Africa (Maghreb) remains low, 
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These two countries compete with each other in 
Africa over aid, trade, and investment. In the aid 
area, in particular, they have competed over markets 
for construction works in infrastructure. At the 
policy level, both countries have pledged massive 
aid for Africa without consulting with each other. 
The analysis shows that Japanese aid, while still 
focusing on infrastructure, can fill in areas in which 
China has little advantage, especially in designing 
development projects from participatory approaches, 
as demonstrated by projects in Kenya and Tunisia.
1. Introduction
July 2019 marked a memorable period for Chinese 
aid in Africa. The month saw the inauguration of the 
luxurious trans-continental railway — Rovos Rail — 
between Tanzania and Angola via the Congo Republic, 
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with the exception of Tunisia (which had the ‘Arab 
Spring’ in 2010). Algeria, Libya, and Egypt are non-
democratic, and most central African countries in Sub-
Sahara Africa such as Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, and so on, are in this category. To be sure, it 
is not correct to describe the whole continent as non-
democratic, as many countries in Southern countries 
(such as South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana, to 
name a few), have nurtured democracy. The trend 
in Africa is clearly mixed. However, there are some 
Western media reports warning that even democratic 
countries such as Tanzania and Senegal have been 
arguably shifting towards less democratic and more 
authoritarian regimes.1 China has strengthened its 
diplomatic and economic ties with these countries in 
recent years.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan used to be the top 
donor to some of these African countries, and it has 
tried to remain relevant in various areas.
In August 2016, the Sixth Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) 
was held in Nairobi, Kenya - the first time ever in 
Africa since its inception in 1993. Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe pledged USD 30 billion for developing 
quality infrastructure, building resilient health 
systems, and laying the foundations for peace and 
stability. One of the pillars of pledge was the so-called 
“quality infrastructure investment” of USD 10 billion 
for the Mombasa/Northern Corridor and Nacala 
Corridor Growth Area in Kenya. Unfortunately, for 
Japan, China is pledging doubled that amount for 
roads, ports, power plants, and other infrastructure 
in the continent. Africa is an integral part of the BRI 
strategy today, insinuating that China has been high 
in quantity of infrastructure but not in quality. Does 
it make sense for Japan to compete in Africa? If yes, 
then in what manner, and where in Africa?
Africa is culturally divided into Northern Arabic 
Africa (or ‘white’ Africa) and Sub-Saharan Africa (or 
‘black’ Africa). One can further divide Sub-Saharan 
Africa into prosperous and democratic southern, 
middle income and relatively free eastern, relatively 
free, but poor, western, and poor and non-democratic 
central. From the Chinese perspective, East, South, 
and North Africa are an integral part of the BRI, 
especially in its maritime and land infrastructure. 
However, its apparent correlation with authoritarian 
regimes is worrying.
2. Chinese Aid in Africa
Less Democratic Africa
Democracy is facing its challenges across the world. 
Freedom House scores countries according to 
“political rights and civil liberties ratings” (PL) and 
“civil liberties indicators” (CL).2 The following is a 
list of the “Best 15” and “Worst 15” in terms of score:
 The Best 15 The Worst 15
1 Finland  Syria
2 Norway  Turkmenistan
3 Sweden  South Sudan *
4 Canada  Eritrea *
5 Netherlands North Korea
6 Australia Equatorial Guinea *
7 New Zealand Sudan *
8 Uruguay Somalia *
9 Denmark Saudi Arabia
10 Ireland  Uzbekistan
11 Belgium Tajikistan
12 Japan  Libya *
13 Portugal  Central African Republic *
14 Switzerland Yemen
15 Chile  China
1 For example, series of China-Africa relations in France Culture (radio program), Le Temps du débat, broadcast in August 2019 (with 
exact date not able to be specified and traced).
2 See Appendix for methodology of Freedom House for democracy.
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The starred countries are from African continent. 
The list of countries with the least PL and CL scores 
has seven African countries, and this list includes 
China. Hence, they are sometimes called the ‘League 
of Non-Democracies.’ Note also that non-African 
nations (North Korea, for example) are also pro-PRC 
regimes. Japan is the only Asian country with one of 
the best PL and CL scores. The list does not contain 
the US or the UK, as those countries’ scores have been 
declining over recent years.
Some other African countries, such as Ghana, Benin, 
South Africa, Namibia, Senegal, and Tunisia have above 
average scores. However, scores for Senegal, Namibia, 
and Benin have declined over the years. For example, 
in Senegal, the incumbent President was re-elected 
in 2017 with an overwhelming majority. However, 
scholars have cast doubt on the election result.
China is also keen on expanding its cultural influence 
by expanding the number of its so-called Confucius 
Institutes. China is increasingly becoming a soft power in 
the continent. Meanwhile, the port of Djibouti is now 
a Chinese military base. Thus, China is becoming a 
military power as well. What is China trying to achieve 
in the continent? The following section examines this 
question from a historical perspective.
History of Chinese Aid for Africa
Western or Japanese observers often do not know that 
China began assisting Africa long before its recent 
expansion. It began in 1964, when Premier Zhou 
Enlai visited Africa to propose the ‘Eight Principles’ 
of Chinese aid to Africa. Until the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Chinese aid in Africa was not a serious topic 
of discussion, and even today, there remains much 
misunderstanding of Chinese aid strategy in Africa. 
Therefore, it is important for us to understand how 
and why China has assisted Africa for such a long 
time.
Historically, there are three stages of Chinese 
commitment to African nations in the past 60 
years. The first stage, from about 1955 to 1979, 
corresponds with China’s state-building stage under 
Mao Zedong, before it adopted radical economic 
reform led by Deng Xiaoping, largely motivated 
by political propaganda than economic interests. 
Many African colonies became independent during 
this period, when African leaders were seeking 
alternative, non-Western governance structures, and 
the Chinese model or ‘Maoism’ fitted such a model. 
Another influential factor was the ‘non-alliance 
movement,’ stemming from the well-known ‘Bandung 
Conference’ that took place in Bandung, Indonesia in 
1955. The non-alliance movement was a ‘third’ way, 
instead of allying with the US-Western capitalist bloc 
or the Soviet-Eastern communist bloc. Although the 
Chinese Communist Government was established in 
denial of Western capitalism in 1949, at the start of 
the Cold War period they had no intention to be under 
the Soviet bloc either. Another factor was that China 
had territorial disputes with the Soviets in those days. 
They wanted to become the leader of the Third World. 
Even today, the Chinese identify themselves as a 
‘South’ (or the third world) member of the world, and 
when discussing foreign aid from China, they prefer 
to use the term ‘South-South Cooperation.’
From the Chinese perspective, a ‘new’ China or the 
PRC was founded on the basis of anti-imperialism, 
with imperialism symbolized by Japanese forces 
before the end of the World War II and by American 
military presence in Asia after the war. Hence, the 
preamble of the PRC’s Constitution states as follows:
“China’s future is closely linked with the future of the 
world. China upholds an independent foreign policy, 
and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence, and develops the diplomatic relations 
and economic and cultural exchanges with the various 
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countries; consistently fights against imperialism, 
hegemony and colonialism, strengthens solidarity 
with peoples of the world, supports the oppressed 
nations and the developing countries in winning 
and safeguarding their national independence 
and developing their national economies, making 
continuous efforts to safeguard world peace and 
promote human progress.” (Preface to the Constitution 
of the People’s Republic of China, as cited by Zhang 
(p. 102, footnote 3).
In other words, helping newly independent Asian 
and African countries was largely the raison d’être of 
the new China. In a street shop in Conakry, Guinea, 
one can see portraits of international sport stars and 
political leaders, among which are Che Guevara, 
Nelson Mandela, and Mao Zedong. In the 1950s, 
China was in direct military confrontation with the 
US during the Korean War. In Chinese eyes, the US 
was taking over colonial status by sending Peace 
Corps and military advisors in the 1960s. Until 1971, 
the PRC was not a formal member of the United 
Nations, as Taiwan (ROC) was a member. Therefore, 
for the PRC, assisting non-aligned nations in the 
third word was virtually the only way to demonstrate 
the legitimacy of their own regime. In a sense, this 
motive remains valid to this day. The PRC’s aid to 
Africa was motivated by the number of countries that 
would vote for China at the UN. Indeed, the PRC won 
over the ROC to replace its representation at the UN, 
becoming one of the Big Five permanent membership 
nations (with veto power) at the Security Council. 
Since then, the PRC’s long-standing position of ‘One 
China’ has been the fait accompli in its international 
relations. Although no data are available to the public, 
there is little doubt that Chinese aid to Africa achieved 
its peak by the early 1970s.
Overview of Chinese Investment in Africa 
Since 2009, China has become the largest investor in 
Africa. In 2017, it opened its first military base abroad, 
in Djibouti. In 2013, Chinese banks lent 3.3 billion 
USD for railway construction between Djibouti and 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Between the two countries 
lies a gas pipeline, also financed by China. In other 
African countries, China has offered finance by lending 
for various infrastructure; for example, the Tanzania-
Angola railway, the South Sudan-Uganda-Kenya 
railway, Mombasa Port (Kenya), Dar es-Salaam Port 
(Tanzania), and Djibouti Port (Djibouti), to name a 
few. Chinese aid to African countries accounts for 
more than 50% of all aid flow to developing countries. 
In China, economic aid is defined as (a) grant aid 
(including project, materials, technical assistance, 
medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid), 
fund for South-South cooperation, (b) interest-free 
loan (0% interest rate, 10 years of repayment, 5 
years of grace period), (c) Chinese EX-IM Bank 
Loan (2-3% interest rate, repayment 20 years, grace 
period 5-7 years), (d) scholarship, and (e) subsidy for 
interest rate. Multilateral contributions are also part of 
economic assistance.
A frequent criticism of Chinese aid is its reliance 
on lending rather than grants. Many indebted poor 
countries have requested rescheduling or refinancing 
their debt with creditors (including China) through 
the Paris Club, of which China is not a member. China 
could possibly join the Paris Club or the OECD, and 
Chinese aid will be required to undergo major scrutiny 
under the OECD-DAC guidelines.
In recent years, the Chinese government is 
recognizing international criticism of the debt trap 
caused by Chinese lending and has noted they “also 
need to take into account debt sustainability in 
mobilizing finance”3 as one of the guiding principles 
of the BRI, signed in May 2017. In September 2018, 
3 Government of the PRC, “Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road,” May 16, 2017, Section 14. https://
eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/13757.htm
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the China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) adopted a 
declaration in Beijing that stated, “China is committed 
to the principles of no political strings, mutual benefits 
and efficient development, supports Africa’s pursuit 
of diversified and sustainable development, and will 
make active efforts to help African countries improve 
debt sustainability and achieve internally-driven 
development and mutually-reinforcing economic and 
social development.”4
To heavily indebted poor countries in Africa, Xi 
Jinping said in September 2018 speech delivered 
at FOCAC Beijing Summit that China “will extend 
US$15 billion of grants, interest-free loans, and 
concessional loans to Africa. For those of Africa's 
least developed countries, heavily indebted, and poor 
countries, landlocked developing countries and small 
island developing countries that have diplomatic 
relations with China, the debt they have incurred in 
the form of interest-free Chinese government loans 
due to mature by the end of 2018 will be exempted.”5 
This exemption is very similar to the actions of OECD 
countries in terms of heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) since 2000. 
By 2012, China had already cancelled debts for 
27 billion RMB, and provided 83.8 billion RMB in 
interest-free loans, both of which are expected to 
increase in the face of international criticism against 
the Chinese ‘debt trap.’ 
More recently, in September 2018, Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed confirmed that China agreed 
to extend the debt repayment period for the Addis 
Ababa-Djibouti cross border railway. According to 
him, China has pledged to extend the debt repayment 
period for a loan it has acquired to construct the 
Ethiopia-Djibouti railway from 10 to 30 years. 
Apparently, China does not want to be considered a 
contributor to debt in Africa.
3. Japanese Aid for Africa through 
TICAD Initiative
At the end of August 2019, leaders of African nations 
gathered in Yokohama, Japan for the 7th Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD). The TICAD initiative was begun in 1993 
as Japan’s first step in expanding African partnerships, 
as Japan had become the top donor in infrastructure 
lending to several African countries by the end of the 
1980s. One of the main motives for Japan to assist at 
that time was to gain support from African nations, 
as Japan needed their help to secure permanent 
membership in the United Nations Security Council, 
a dream for Japan in those days.
Today, Japanese leaders may no longer pursue this 
political motive as in the 1980s and 1990s because 
it has no support from its major Asian neighbors 
(China and Korea) for such a position. Furthermore, 
the UN has become a less attractive place. The US 
has been boycotting its financial contributions and has 
withdrawn from major UN organizations. Overall, in 
the 21st century, the UN plays a much less significant 
role.
Initially, the TICAD was held every five years in 
Tokyo. It was a big event for Japan to host delegates 
from African nations. However, the FOCAC initiative 
by China became increasingly influential and visible. 
The FOCAC meets every three years, alternating 
between Beijing and an African city. Given this rival 
movement, Japanese policy makers decided in 2016 
after TICAD 6 in Nairobi, to meet every three years 
in alternating locations.
Back in 1993, when the TICAD was held in Tokyo 
for the first time, I remember I went to see President 
Rawlings from Ghana, then in his late 40s, who flew 
to Tokyo on his private jet. He struck me as somebody 
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan” (2019-2021)”, September 5, 2018, 
Section 3.9.2.  https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1593683.shtml
5 Xinhua Net, September 3, 2018, internet article. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm
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possessed with natural charisma; simultaneously, he 
was an open-minded technocrat who, unlike President 
Moi of Kenya, knew how to set things right. Ghana 
was a good student of the World Bank and IMF in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when it tries to implement the 
Structural Adjustment Policies as suggested by the 
Breton Woods Institutions. Dr. Botchway, a Harvard 
trained economist, advised President Rawlings to enter 
dialogue with Washington economists. Ravi Kanbur, 
who was the World Bank resident representative in 
Ghana, was a good advisor.
For Kenya too, the TICAD worked well. There 
were long discussions about debt sustainability in 
Kenya. If Kenya was categorized as an HIPC, as 
was likely at that time, major OECD-DAC countries 
would stop assisting it due to its poor human rights 
records. The TICAD provided an opportunity for 
Kenya to continue receiving funds from Japan and 
escape becoming an HIPC. As examined here, the 
famous hydraulic power plant in Western Kenya 
(Sondu-Miriu project), assisted by a Japanese ODA 
loan, could not have been completed if the country 
had fallen into HIPC status at that time. In a sense, 
Japanese aid saved Kenya.
Kenya Scandal in Both Ends
President Daniel Moi, known a ‘Nyayo,’ a Swahili 
nickname, was not very popular among Washington 
economists in the 1990s. Born in 1924, he served 
as the President of Kenya (after the first President 
Kenyatta) from 1978 to 2002. 
Moi was not popular among international NGOs 
because of corruption and human rights abuses 
charges against him. No multiparty election was held 
for presidency until 1991. Amid foreign criticism, he 
was forced to allow plural party elections starting in 
1991 and was re-elected twice under a ‘democratic’ 
system, although opposition parties claimed 
corruption of votes, and therefore, the election results 
were dubious. In 2002 he retired after serving two 
terms as president, as per the constitution.
Moi was unpopular among Washington economists, 
because unlike leaders in Ghana or Uganda, he was 
reluctant to accept the ‘conditionalities’ set forth by the 
World Bank and IMF SALs. These conditionalities, 
ranging from increase in Value Added Tax (VAT) to 
privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
were often drafted by economists in those institutions 
who did not understand local realities. Thus, he 
gained local support but lost international support. 
International donors have stopped assisting the 
country since the late 1990s. Naturally, Kenya was in 
huge deficit because of its large public investments, 
as was common in other neighboring countries, and 
it became difficult to repay debts from international 
lenders. This led to the vicious circle of a debt trap.
The TICAD provided an opportunity for Kenya 
to return to an international donor community circle, 
and perhaps saved Kenya from becoming an HIPC. 
Chinese aid has followed the Japanese example. The 
FOCAC met every three years while the TICAD met 
only every five years. The FOCAC met in Africa and 
in Beijing alternately, while the TICAD was meet only 
every three years in Tokyo. Increasingly, the FOCAC 
became more visible than the TICAD.
In 2001 and 2002 a scandal within the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) erupted and 
attracted huge media attention. This was also called 
the ‘Muneo Scandal,’ named after the former Vice-
Minister for MOFA Muneo Suzuki who had strong 
influence over decision-making in ODA allocations. 
He was charged with corruption in an African ODA 
project, namely, the Sondu-Miriu Hydroelectric 
Power (to be explained below). 
Suzuki was an influential politician at that time 
on African ODA issues and was locked in battled 
with another political superstar, Ms. Makiko Tanaka, 
daughter of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, 
over MOFA reforms. The issue was taken up in the 
Japanese Diet (parliament) over several days. Did 
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Suzuki receive money from a Japanese construction 
company involved in Sondu-Miriu? Was Tanaka 
capable of implementing MOFA-ODA reforms to 
make ODA allocations and principles crystal clear? 
Ultimately, Suzuki was arrested on another charge 
and Tanaka was fired. The Deputy Vice Minister of 
MOFA (career diplomat) had to leave office before the 
end of his term. 
Therefore, the Sondu-Miriu project became 
muddled with politics, giving it a very bad name in 
Japan and abroad. NGOs on both ends have protested 
against the project on different grounds. For a Kenyan 
NGO, the project neglected local voices; a prominent 
local NGO leader was arrested on the premises of 
the project site. A Japanese NGO has highlighted 
the violation of human rights and environmental 
considerations, as the construction of the dam changed 
the ecological system of the river.
4. Case Studies of Japanese Aids in 
African Continent
(1) Kenya – Sondu Miriu Hydroelectric Power 
Project
Background
This section presents a comparative overview of 
Japanese assistance for economic infrastructure sector 
in African nations, with the example of a hydraulic 
power plant in Sondu-Miriu, a Western region of 
Kenya, which has received assistance through a 
Japanese ODA loans since the early 1990s. This 
symbolic project of mutual friendship provides an 
example of consensus-based institution building 
through Japanese infrastructure lending, which 
contrasts with massive capital flow from China since 
around 2010.
The long Presidency of Moi (1978–2002) 
destabilized Kenya’s policy base in the early 1990s, 
when the country faced anti-corruption and pro-
democracy campaigns from both Kenya and Japan. 
Further, the delay in implementation of the structural 
adjustment programs since the 1980s worsened its 
relations with the World Bank and IMF. When Kenya 
was internationally isolated in the late 1990s over 
its human rights records and structural adjustments, 
Japan helped it out.
The Sondu-Miriu Project, a hydroelectric power 
plant based in Western Kenya, was originally intended 
as a concessional loan project in March 1997, but 
took more than a decade to complete, including a 
suspension of a few years in the early 2000s, when 
Kenya was under discussion of being classified as an 
HIPC , exempted from repaying debts to international 
creditors. The loan resumed politically when President 
Moi met with Vice-Minister Suzuki of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan, expressing his intention to repay the debt 
from Japan, regardless of the application of HIPC 
debt relief. Fortunately, for both countries, Kenya was 
not classified as an HIPC. As mentioned, the project 
also went through political scandals in both countries. 
In Kenya, an NGO leader was arrested at the project 
site, and in Japan, the Vice-Minister was arrested for 
corruption charges on an ODA project. However, the 
project had resumed by 2005.
The Project
Given these events, both Kenya and Japan decided 
to take a cautious approach and implement the 
project through ‘consensus-building.’ In 2011-
12, the author conducted an evaluation study on 
this project, examining ‘relevance,’ ‘efficiency,’ 
‘effectiveness,’ ‘impact’ and ‘sustainability,’ in 
compliance with the guidelines set forth by the 
OECD-DAC (Development Assistant Commission).6 
We conducted a sample survey of 200 households 
6 OECD-DAC, “Evaluation Criteria” web site. https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm
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near the project to understand their perception of 
the project. To our surprise, only 23 households (or 
11.5%) had electricity contracts with the power plant. 
The non-contractors did not sign the contract because 
of the lack of electricity supply to their community 
(50 households), high electricity bills (where the 
community is served) (111 households), and other 
reasons (5 households). Further, many households 
recognized the employment generation and business 
opportunities during construction, and the new 
infrastructure (power station and related facilities) 
as major positive impacts. The noise and pollution 
during construction, and the loss of employment 
after construction were perceived as major negative 
impacts.
Overall, the rate of satisfaction with the project 
shows that 140 households (70%) were “very 
much satisfied” or “satisfied,” far exceeding the 55 
households (27.5%) that were “unsatisfied” or “very 
much unsatisfied.”7 A major reason for this satisfaction 
was the economic benefits, such as employment (132 
households), while a major reason for dissatisfaction 
was the non-economic costs, such as worsening of the 
environment during construction (45 households).
When the project was in suspension, a Technical 
Committee was established to discuss requests 
from stakeholders, including NGOs, community 
representatives, government and company 
representatives, and JICA. The beneficiary survey 
revealed a relatively low level of recognition of the 
committee (16), while people were nearly equally 
“aware of” (105 households) and “unaware of” (91 
households) it. Among those who recognized the 
committee, 86 households (81.9%) replied that they 
were either “unsatisfied” or “very much unsatisfied,” far 
exceeding the 18 households (16.6%) who replied that 
they were either “satisfied” or “very much satisfied.” 
The reasons for satisfaction included “opinions and 
interests were reflected” (9 households), “problems 
were solved” (10 households), while the reasons 
for dissatisfaction included “opinions and interests 
were not reflected” (17 households), “problems were 
not solved” (49 households), and “participatory, 
democratic and transparent process was not available” 
(27 households).8
These results suggest that overall, residents were 
satisfied with the project, while they were not aware 
of the Technical Committee, and unfavorable opinions 
dominated even among those who recognized the 
committee because the problems raised were not 
solved (49 households), and so on. However, based on 
requests from local people and NGOs, the committee 
recommended and conducted additional surveys (on 
fishery and livery standards, as well as other issues). 
This suggests that the monitoring by the committee 
of impacts on fishery and health damage caused by 
dust and other factors have reduced public concerns. 
However, most likely, these actual contributions by 
the committee were not fully shared with the locals.
CSR activities by the company include efforts 
related to water supply, education, and the 
environment. About 20,000 people in the downstream 
area of the Sondu River receive water supply through 
standpipes, as treated water, and by establishing a rural 
water supply association, thus, contributing to the 
supply of safe water. Initially, the company assumed 
that local communities should supply water through 
self-help efforts. However, following discussions 
and a recommendation by the Technical Committee, 
the company funded the entire water supply. Water 
provided through water kiosks and standpipes is used 
for drinking or agricultural purposes, improving the 
standard of living by reducing the labor involved 
in fetching water and by providing safe water. 
7 JICA (2011), “Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese ODA Loan “Sondu-Miriu Hydropower Project I, II”” https://www2.jica.go.jp/en/
evaluation/pdf/2011_KE-P21_4.pdf, pp. 9-10.
8 JICA (2011), ibid, pp. 9-10.
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Communities living downstream of the Sondu 
River also receive water supply (31 water kiosks 
and 3 standpipes) as do communities near the outlet 
channel (5 standpipes). In addition, locals within the 
base camp receive free water, which is open to the 
local community. The locals have appreciated these 
activities.
Overall Evaluation
There is no serious negative impact on the natural 
environment; further, there are no severe problems 
involving relocation and pollution and related effects 
on health. The project cost slightly exceeded the 
plan, and the project period significantly exceeded 
the plan — there was a delay of more than five years 
in the signing of the Loan Agreement (L/A) — 
which translated to low efficiency. There is no major 
problem in the structure, finance, technique, or 
current status of operation and maintenance; hence, 
the sustainability of the project is high. Therefore, this 
project is evaluated to be satisfactory.
In conclusion, with a process of trial and error, 
Kenya and Japan collaborated closely to build 
consensus on this controversial project, but much 
remains to be done to incorporate this consensus 
into actual decision making. This is an important 
lesson learned, no matter who finances the project. 
If anything, Chinese aid should also learn from this 
project so that their assistance can reflect local needs.
(2) Case Study Tunisia 
Background
One-half of Tunisia is arid, its yearly overall 
precipitation is scarce, and in terms of geography, 
precipitation, and annual available surface, water 
supplies are unevenly distributed. Moreover, the 
Greater Tunis Area, which is in the northern region 
and the center of Tunisia’s economic development, 
has suffered from impending demands for drinking 
water because of its rapidly increasing population 
and lack of irrigation water in the dry seasons. Thus, 
the Tunisian government has been implementing 
an integrated water development plan for the entire 
northern region (Water Resources Development 
Master Plan in Northern Tunisia, of 1975) to secure 
drinking water, industrial, and irrigation water 
resources. Based on this master plan, the government 
has installed major water-supply channels and water 
conduits to each city. One example is the Cap Bon 
Canal, which connects the Medjerda River with Cap 
Bon (an area that produces citrus fruits, which are 
major agricultural exports) in the southwest peninsula 
of Tunisia; another is the Sejnane–Joumine–Medjerda 
pipeline, which was built in the course of this project. 
In 2004, water resource development in Tunisia 
helped satisfy 80% of the developable water demand, 
and in the northern region, the resources exceeded the 
gross demand. A dearth of pipelines, however, meant 
an insufficient distribution of these developed water 
resources to areas in need (i.e., the Greater Tunis area 
and its environs, Cap Bon, Sahel, the Greater Sfax 
Area, etc.).
Project Outline
The scope of this project was to source the financial aid 
necessary to construct water pipes (a total extension 
of about 90 km), extend existing pump facilities, and 
source consulting services in the north of Tunisia. The 
goal was to provide high-quality drinking, industrial, 
and irrigation water to the Greater Tunis Area and to 
the areas surrounding Tunis, Tunisia’s capital city.
The project was not completed as scheduled, 
primarily due to the ‘Arab Spring’ in Tunisia at the 
end of 2010. All administrative procedures stopped 
for several months and project implementation was 
delayed in this period. Residents refused to provide 
land for the previous offer by the government.
The project involved an important component of 
building 65,000 m3 of pondage, supposed to be ready 
by the time of the appraisal; however, construction 
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was suspended because of a neighboring resident’s 
refusal. During this suspension, an additional survey 
was conducted to examine geometrical problems. 
Ultimately, the decision was to build a pondage with 
reduced capacity (30,000 m3), in consideration with 
soft-soil conditions and residents’ opinions. Thereafter, 
attempts were made to initiate construction, but this 
had to be canceled, as the construction would not 
be completed before the expiration of the ODA loan 
terms. As of this ex-post evaluation, some parts of the 
building site have been dug, and machines intended 
for use were left behind, ready for resumption of 
construction.
Evaluation Result
There were several obstacles after, or because, of the 
Arab Spring, in implementing this project. National 
rights awareness and an anti-government attitudes 
led to sabotage by residents. Because local residents 
prevented the construction of the water-supply pipe 
from Sidi El Barrak to Sejnane by force, construction 
was suspended. In addition, many executives were 
exiled following the 2011 revolution, leading to overall 
stagnation in administrative procedures. However, 
this does not mean a total absence of administrative 
organization: indeed, line ministries in charge of basic 
infrastructure, including police, fire departments, and 
military, continued to hold their function. Therefore, 
in evaluation, no subperiods should be removed from 
the project period as forces majeure.
We conducted a beneficiary survey for 90 
households. Many survey respondents had 
experienced no water-supply outage. However, a 
portion — especially those living at high altitudes — 
had experienced a drop in water pressure. One-half 
of residents drank tap water, while the other half did 
not because they do not trust its quality. One-half of 
the residents were satisfied with the quality of the 
drinking water.  Ultimately, we rated this project to be 
satisfactory, largely because the economic return from 
the project was positive and significant. There was an 
increased profit from sales of oranges and other citrus 
products in Cap Bon, generating positive income 
for farmers. Of course, this is highly dependent 
on rainfall, and calculation was subject to various 
technical constraints. Nevertheless, the water pipeline 
provided additional capacity of water transportation 
in the end.
Challenges 
The issue of land acquisition cannot be overlooked. 
Land used to construct water conduits between 
Joumine and Medjerda were expropriated by Tunisia’s 
government in 1987 when the first water conduits 
were constructed in the same region. Therefore, land 
acquisition did not take place during this project. 
Local residents protested further land expropriation 
in a neighboring area before the start of the 1987 
project. Their descendants again raised this issue 
and demanded compensation after the start of this 
project. In April 2011, these residents sabotaged the 
construction of a water-supply pipe from Joumine 
to Medjerda; thus, although materials had been 
procured in July 2012, the construction had yet to 
start. Eventually, the construction of the water-supply 
pipe started at the behest of an administrative order; 
it was completed in July 2016 and transferred to a 
new executing agency in January 2017. As opposing 
action did not occur after project completion, one can 
confirm that any negative impact was minimal.
Japan faces a dilemma in economic assistance. To 
emphasize the effectiveness or efficiency of a project, 
one can rely on the ‘black cat, white cat’ policy; in 
an extreme case, one might use the most authoritarian 
method to complete the project most effectively and 
efficiently. Tunisians had the capacity to do so before 
the revolution. However, after the revolution, they 
decided to examine and focus on the procedural 
aspects, namely, accountability and transparency. One 
might as well call it project governance. Nonetheless, 
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it is difficult to achieve procedural justice without 
sacrificing effectiveness and efficiency. This requires 
huge costs and time. 
5. Concluding Remarks - Can China 
and Japan Cooperate on Aid for 
Africa?
As seen above, there are many differences and 
similarities in the aims of China and Japan in the 
African continent They are competing in similar 
areas, which also could imply that there are possible 
areas for cooperation between the two countries. 
There is however one fundamental distinction 
between the two countries; China is not a member 
of OECD-DAC while Japan is, meaning that China 
does not have to comply with various guidelines set 
forth by OECD-DAC, i.e., environmental guidelines, 
corruption guidelines, procurement guidelines, etc.9 
Japan cannot assist countries with poor human rights 
records, while China seems to be actively pursuing 
collaborating with ‘dictatorial league of nations’ in 
Africa.
There are common areas in which both countries 
can collaborate. Both China and Japan have invested 
in economic infrastructure, which requires massive 
capital investments that need co-financing from 
various financiers. ODA alone is not sufficient to 
cover financial gap in infrastructure, and private 
capital must be fill in the gap. In this context, China 
and Japan can complement with each other.
In recent years, China has been very active and 
vocal in contributing to the international public goods. 
One area is the contribution to UN Peace-Keeping 
Operations (PKO). After the retreat from South 
Sudan, Japanese contribution to UNPKO reached 
a negligible level, while China has increased its 
presence in this field. As mandated by the UN, these 
activities are quite consistent with Japanese principles 
of international cooperation. Hence, there is no point 
of competition in this area.
China has been also expressive about its role in 
SDGs, which Japan is also pursuing actively. SDGs 
are also international development goals that all 
signing countries adhere to as common goals toward 
2030. It is therefore possible for both countries to at 
least share SDGs as common goals.
In conclusion, mutually beneficial cooperation for 
African could be possible in many areas, especially 
when multilateral agencies can play an intermediate 
role. However, it is not desirable to Japan to be 
part of ‘league of Chinese friends’ --- Japan should 
probably be more vocal about its partnership with 
African people who aspire to be part of ‘league of 
democracies.’
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Appendix Freedom House Index
Freedom House asks the following questions to determine 
political rights:
“Was the current head of government or other chief national 
authority elected through free and fair elections?”
“Were the current national legislative representatives elected 
through free and fair elections?”
“Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they 
implemented impartially by the relevant election 
management bodies?”
“Do the people have the right to organize in different political 
parties or other competitive political groupings of their 
choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the 
rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?”
“Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase 
its support or gain power through elections?”
“Are the people’s political choices free from domination 
by the military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, 
economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is 
not democratically accountable?”
“Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, 
religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have 
full political rights and electoral opportunities?”
“Do the freely elected head of government and national 
legislative representatives determine the policies of the 
government?”
“Are the safeguards against official corruption strong and 
effective?”
“Does the government operate with openness and 
transparency?”
“Are there free and independent media?”
“Are individuals free to practice and express their religious 
faith or nonbelief in public and private?”
“Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system 
free from extensive political indoctrination?”
“Are individuals free to express their personal views 
on political or other sensitive topics without fear of 
surveillance or retribution?”
“Is there freedom of assembly?”
“Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or 
labor organizations?”
“Is there an independent judiciary?”
“Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?”
“Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force 
and freedom from war and insurgencies?”
“Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of 
various segments of the population?”
“Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the 
ability to change their place of residence, employment, or 
education?”
“Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property 
and establish private businesses without undue 
interference from state or non-state actors?”
“Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including 
choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection 
from domestic violence, and control over appearance?”
“Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom 
from economic exploitation?”
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